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"We Think That We Think Clearly, But That's Only Because We Don't Think Clearly":
Brian Josephson on Mathematics, Mind, and the Human World*
About five years ago, Andrew Robinson, who has written quite a bit about Tagore, sent
me the Einstein-Tagore discussion (Einstein 1931) and asked me for my comments on it. It
seemed to me, as has been said previously, that they were rather talking past each other. Einstein
was not understanding what Tagore was saying.  The point at issue was whether we have an
objective world or a human world. Einstein thought that there was objective reality and that
Tagore's position was nonsense. I think my comment at the time was that Einstein was not
appreciating how much the processes of construction, engaged in by our senses and minds, affect
what we see and what our science consists of. I'll come back to that point later. But anyway I
think it's because of that vague comment that I found myself invited here and trying to make
sense of this issue.  I've been explaining at various times that I don't really understand Tagore and
I find what is written on these subjects pretty confusing.  But I have been attempting to make
sense of it. So what I'm going to do is talk a bit about the relationships between what Tagore
seems to be saying and the kind of approach or the kind of problems I've been working on
myself. 
As I said, the question is whether we have an objective world or a human world, and
Tagore's position was that essentially everything is human, everything we know about is human.
I'd like to start with something which perhaps not much attention has been given to—the
mathematical side. It just so happens that on my way here I looked in the airport bookshop at
Heathrow to find something to read, and lo and behold there was a book there called The
Mathematical Experience, by Davis and Hersh (1980), evidently put there to assist me with my
coming lecture. But let me first, before I say what's in that book, quote from the Tagore-Einstein
Dialogue.  
Tagore was saying that “truth is the perfect comprehension of the universal mind” and
that's the thing I should perhaps just say a bit about. Tagore talks about the individual minds and
the universal mind. The universal mind is like a perfected version of the human mind.  It's the
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ideal version of it, I believe. So “individuals approach” the abilities of the universal mind
“through our own mistakes and blunders,” our “experience,” and so on. Einstein objected to this
in the case of say mathematics. He said, “I cannot prove that scientific truth must be conceived
as a truth that is valid independent of humanity, but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that
the Pythagorean  theorem in geometry,” about the square on the hypotenuse, “states something
that is approximately true independent of the existence of man.”  So the question was raised, how
much mathematical truth is independent of man, and how much is human construction. 
Going back to The Mathematical Experience, what a lot of the book discusses is about
various happenings in the history of mathematics, what happens when new ideas emerge and
people work them through. They also discuss attempts to understand what mathematics is.
Because the curious thing is that, once one is trained in mathematics, one does the mathematics
fairly automatically. Well, sometimes it's hard work trying to understand something, but one
simply feeds the problem into one's mind and then the understanding emerges. But if you ask
what is going on, what is mathematics, then this is a very difficult problem.  Every approach
seems to have some difficulties and to be in some ways not reflecting reality. Davis and Hersch
discuss three approaches, or three theories about what mathematics is: Platonism, constructivism,
and formalism. 
Formalism is the idea that Hilbert introduced in trying to get a proper foundation of
mathematics—philosophers like Frege as well. The idea is that mathematics is proving theorems
from axioms. So you might think you would simply state what your axioms are, then formalize
your processes of deduction.  Then you could go through mechanically, or a computer could go
through verifying the proof, and that is mathematics. Well the difficulty of this is that, for a start,
that we don't really do things that way. There are lots of gaps in the arguments. Then there's the
question of where do the axioms come from, because we don't actually play mathematics as a
game like chess. The general belief is that we adopt axioms because they are true in some sense.
So formalism seems to leave behind discussions of truth and meaningfulness, which seem so
important. Furthermore the formal approach runs into trouble, as Godel showed, since it turns
out that axiom systems cannot encompass every true theorem.
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The constructivist approach was adopted by people who were doubtful about whether
some mathematical arguments were correct. Constructivists say you should not accept the kind
of argument which proves that something exists but doesn't tell you how you would find it.
People got quite some way using this approach where you only use explicit arguments; you don't
allow reductio ad absurdum arguments because there's something a little suspect about them.
That doesn't seem to encompass the world of mathematics either and again doesn't agree with
many mathematicians’ intuitions. 
Then the third approach is the Platonic idea or Platonism.  Gödel was one of those who
advocated this approach.  Gödel, like many mathematicians, thought that we have direct contact
with mathematical truth: there's some domain of knowledge we could contact.  To the extent we
could expand our minds to experience that domain, we would know what is true and what is not.
At least this would tell us where the axioms come from.  Thus we could determine truth or falsity
even in some cases where we can’t seemingly prove whether a result is true or not—the
continuum hypothesis is one of these.  One of the things it points out in this book is that although
we can't by axioms prove or disprove the continuum hypothesis, we might someday get enough
insight into what this particular theorem means that we would recognize whether it was true or
not. So, the Platonic concept is that really there is a mathematical truth independent of man and
all we do is observe it, just as we observe a physical phenomenon. 
All of these approaches have difficulties.  Let me discuss what kinds of difficulties there
are with Platonism. Partly we seem actually to be fallible.  There seems to be something wrong
with the idea that we can contact truth—for what we take to be truth, changes. So Davis and
Hersh advocate an idea which is actually much closer to Tagore's and it stems from the
philosophy of Lakatos, who is in the tradition of Popper. Popper took a simple idea that we arrive
at the notion of truth from the fact that ideas can be falsified; so the way science evolves is that
people make conjectures, find ways of testing them, and some of them are falsified—but those
that remain become the body of science. Well, Lakatos took this idea in a slightly different
direction in that he said when your hypothesis is disconfirmed, you just don't throw it away.  You
can rescue it by changing your assumptions.  So you've got a complicated situation where
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science occasionally has to sidestep slightly and go in a different direction. Still, you approach
some kind of truth.
Anyway, Davis and Hersh treat mathematics just like any other ordinary human
experience. Their argument as to why mathematics seems to be objective is that people talk to
each other; they explain what their ideas mean.  This process of communication leads everyone
to get mental states with the same sort of structure, and because their mental states have the same
sort of structure, they will come to the same conclusions as to what is true or not.  Davis and
Hersh go through all sorts of arguments to make the point that really mathematics is like this.
We don't automatically understand something. We talk it over and gradually things become
clearer as our minds get at it. We are trained to think in the right way about a new mathematical
idea. And only people with brains that are sufficiently trainable will be able to understand the
ideas in the first place. So they have this sort of fallibilist approach and it's an approach to
mathematics which reconciles the apparent universality and objectivity, but also sees it as a
human activity. So what they arrive at—and I think it's a very compelling argument, detailed
with lots of examples of how mathematicians actually work—is a Tagorian viewpoint that
mathematics is a particular kind of human activity which comes out with something apparently
universal. But there is nothing especially privileged about mathematics. 
This recalls an argument I had at a following a conference in Finland a few years ago
with a philosopher, Rachel Waugh, who gave a talk (Waugh 1995) insisting that meaning came
before truth. I said isn't mathematics different, isn't that real truth? I found I was unable to
produce a really convincing argument for mathematical truth being real. In the end I produced
my own undestanding of the situation on the basis of an assertion that mathematics is just like
knitting. What's it got to do with knitting? Well knitting is a set of practices designed to produce
something like a sweater which you can wear and which protects you against the cold. A valid
knitting ‘theorem’ would detail a process which produces something that works, like a sweater
resistant to the wind. In the same way, a valid mathematical idea such as that of number or
mathematical induction is something that works and is resistant to the winds of skepticism. This
strictly has to be done in cases like the treatment of infinity.  There one has to work quite a way
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to find the garments or the sort of ideas which are resistant to the winds of skepticism. Anyway,
from this point of view the only real difference between mathematics and knitting is that
mathematical truths are much wider in their scope than the truths of knitting. So there is
something special about mathematics, but nevertheless it's a particular subset of all possible
activities. 
Okay, so that's the human sense of mathematical truth. Let me now move on from there to
physical truth. I think here the case for science revealing human truths is much easier to make
because science changes from era to era, particularly say at the foundation of high energy
physics. Clearly there is some human activity which is trying to make sense of nature, trying to
find the truth of nature. But it is always provisional and over the course of time you may see
things in a completely different way, as science advances. So however much people think they're
coming to a theory of everything—and these things always seem quite doubtful anyway as
evidence comes up against them—these just seem to be provisional truths which are derivative of
a particular way in which one approaches the study of the universe at some particular time.
Indeed, beyond what we do as science there may be an indefinitely large part of reality that we
know nothing about. Moreover, what we do perceive is very much structured by our tools. For
example, the fact that I perceive a visual scene as people, chairs and so on, is certainly very
derivative upon the fact that I have sense organs which are especially adapted to see these kinds
of things. Also, the particular scientific theories we get are very much a result of particular
mathematical and experimental tools we used. So we're really being very something-centric; it's
a very parochial view we have. We imagine that this is how things really are. In fact, it’s just a
view of nature from a particular standpoint of what we know at this particular era. 
It's very interesting to ask why people get the idea that science is giving a complete view
of nature. I think it's related to what Jonathan Shear was saying yesterday, or an extension of it,
about the way children of a particular age get the concept of an object. When you cover
something like a ball with a cloth, before a certain age children act as if it no longer exists, but
later on they act as if it's still there and they try to remove the cloth to get at the object. Now
clearly it is adaptive to have this object concept. This concept says there's a reality beyond what
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you know.  It is adaptive because it often works. The thing can be recovered and hasn't gone
away forever. As the philosopher Merleau-Ponty pointed out (Dillon 1988), this is what seems to
be behind science. We have an objectifying instinct which causes us to view the universe in
objective terms and do what we can with it. This is a very adaptive kind of thing because to the
extent that this objectivization of reality is the case we can form plans for dealing with the
universe. For example, if a timetable tells us that a bus will be present at a particular time at a
particular place, we can go there and catch the bus rather than going by chance. That's one form
of objectivization. So it is an important human capacity to represent the universe as if it were
what we thought it was. It takes a lot of load out of our theorizing if we have this capacity to
think of the universe as being so and so. But, of course, the universe never actually is the same as
what we think it is. What we think it is is only an approximation, even if we define what the
correspondence is. 
So, in other words, it does seem Tagore is right that we have this human vision which
defines what the world is for us. We have an inability, or at least a difficulty, in looking beyond it
and seeing that this might not be the whole truth. 
I thought of an aphorism once to summarize this which I have on my blackboard.  It says
that "We think that we think clearly, but that's only because we don't think clearly." You see the
natural automatic thing is to think that all these thoughts are really representing how things are.
But the world was not that simple. We're not seeing things clearly enough to recognize that
things are not that clear. 
I want to go into some different kinds of issues now. Let me introduce this by talking
about something that is very familiar to us in physics and that's the property of sound waves.
Because here this is a case where we have a spuriously simple mathematics. This is in fact an
illustration of what I was talking about, where the science of one era is superceded by the science
of a later era. Because a sound wave is something which is just like a wave form that propagates
for a certain velocity in accordance with the wave equation.  But we know that that's not really
what's going on. There's another level, but let me not go to the ultimate level. Let me go to
classical physics according to which the gas (in which the sound wave moves) is made up out of
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a collection of particles which bounce off each other. We know from this kinetic theory of gases
that there's a deeper underlying reality, a more complicated reality which is underneath the
simpler reality. The message we can learn here is that there may be a more complicated reality
underneath the reality that we study by physics. 
There's an interesting point I can make here as a halfway stage to where I want to get to
in a moment.  Suppose we just dump molecules randomly into a container. That would then
correspond to a very turbulent kind of motion which might not support sound waves. What
causes sound waves to be possible is that, first of all, the gas organizes itself so it is in some kind
of rough equilibrium.  It is that equilibrium state which supports the sound waves. So the
manifest, orderly phenomenon of sound waves comes out of an unmanifest kind of order, the
background equilibrium system. It's been recognized in the last few years that that kind of thing
happens and is a sort of a correction to how one normally thinks about science. This is the
phenomenon known as emergence. It is something which applies to all sorts of complex systems
like the weather, biology, and so on. It's now being recognized that if we have a complicated
system, it will go along obeying one kind of law and then all of a sudden there will be a switch
and a different kind of phenomenon will emerge out of it. And it will do so in an essentially
unpredictable way. So there's a certain random element to what we observe. There's a more
fundamental background which organizes itself and after it has organized itself some various
phenomena will emerge. So in all these cases the behavior you observe is not the fundamental
behavior. It's contingent on what's going on in the deeper level. 
So I think the question we need to ask now is—can we say anything about this deeper
level. All these arguments I've talked about here suggest that what we observe through science,
this human activity, is not the most fundamental activity, not the most fundamental phenomenon
possible. Here we get to things which I don't know too much about so I can only speculate and
perhaps others will speculate with me in the discussion. Tagore talks about there being an
“absolute truth,” Brahman, and this may be connected with the background order out of which
manifest phenomena emerge. One of the points Tagore makes, and all the mystical traditions, is
that you cannot discuss this background order in the same sort of way. You can know it and
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experience it, but you cannot analyze it in a scientific manner, as this thing is beyond our usual
rational activities through which we try to understand. One thing I have discussed as part of the
mind/matter unification project we have at Cambridge is the phenomenon of music. I don't know
perhaps where to place that. But the suggestion that came out of this research, which I've been
doing in collaboration with a musicologist, Tethys Carpenter (Josephson and Carpenter 1996), is
that there are certain fundamental forms which have an activising effect on life. We can study
what these forms are in music, and perhaps you can again study the forms by meditation. Then
there would be some different kind of science to the kind we have now, based on subjective
experience, though, whether we are going to call that science or not is unclear. Are we getting
beyond Tagore’s “human truth” by these means? I don't know what Tagore would have said
about that.
So, to summarize, I think one can certainly justify by a number of arguments Tagore's
point that our science as a human activity and our universe also may be a human universe,
possibly something which came into existence at the time of the big bang. Tagore has this picture
that you have a strongly interconnective system, like a solid but that's composed of people and a
material universe. There may be some special system which science has become most aware of.
But there may be something else beyond that which will be the task of future science to try and
understand.1
*Talk delivered 20 September 1998, Storrs, CT.  Transcription by Anne Theriault.  Edited by
Patrick Colm Hogan.
1 Possible clarification of the situation is given by a more detailed reading of Waugh’s paper,
where she writes of “representational contents which contain the germs of understanding but
which do not make truth claims and whose meanings are not given by truth conditions”.  The
forms in music in the paper by Carpenter and myself (where we wrote of composer’s “intuitive
ability to be aware of the creative potentials of particular sounds even when considered in their
most elementary forms) are in some respects similar.  Here are things differing from the ordinary 
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concept of truth; perhaps they can be characterized as “truthful experiences”, emerging from
Brahman: truthful in the light of their positive potential.
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